In order to be perceived as legitimate by those subject to it, a system of legal norms should be free of contradictions. The very idea of justice is incompatible with an erratic interpretation and, subsequently, arbitrary application of norms. Systemic contradictions make actions by state authorities unpredictable. However, at the domestic as well as at the international level, considerations of power and interest have often made of the respective body of norms a "hermeneutical minefield." The international legal order in particular contains contradictions even between the most basic principles such as state sovereignty, self-determination and the rules of international humanitarian law. While, at the national level, the authority of constitutional courts may help to eliminate contradictions and inconsistencies, there exists, apart from limited regional arrangements, no such separation of powers at the international level. The lecture analyzes, inter alia, the systemic, destabilizing impact of normative contradictions in exemplary cases related to the interpretation of the United Nations Charter and draws conclusions in terms of the philosophy of law.
international law), including those of jus cogens, and the ever increasing set of specific norms contained in intergovernmental treaties, particularly the United Nations Charter. If (A) is not guaranteed, we are faced with an erosion of confidence in the system, indeed a loss of legitimacy. If (B) cannot be ensured, the system as such collapses since the very validity of norms is at stake if a Constitutiomore generally: a system of norms -contains (logical) contradictions. Although the validity of norms (values) as such cannot be proven in the material sense, i.e. in terms of their content (a normative statement is neither true nor false), logic applies at the formal level, i.e. to the relations between norms, namely questions as to the compatibility of their content.
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Strictly speaking, the rule of law remains an abstract ideal if (A) or (B) cannot be ensured. While the requirements under (A) can -in principle at least -be fulfilled on the basis of sincerity and good will of state authorities, and under the watchful eye of an active citizenry, those under (B), pertaining to the very integrity of the respective system of norms and to doctrinaire issues, are an entirely different matter. In actual fact, contradictions between norms are often overlooked or covered up, whether for reasons of "legistic" convenience or political expediencythe latter often as a result of power interests 1 For details see the author's considerations: "Zum Verhältnis von logischen Prinzipien und Rechtsnormen," in: Hans Köchler, Philosophie -Recht -Politik: Abhandlungen zur politischen Philosophie und zur Rechtsphilosophie. (Veröffentlichungen der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Wissenschaft und Politik an der Universität Innsbruck, Vol. IV.) Vienna, New York: Springer, 1985, pp. 9ff. or, more precisely, power politics, described as "realpolitik" at the global level.
We shall concentrate here on the latter, namely contradictions between norms in the political context. Unavoidably, we can only elaborate on some of the most striking and potentially destabilizing cases of normative conflicts.
TYPES OF CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
In relations between states, confusion resulting from irreconcilable normative conflicts abounds. Not only is the body of norms subsumed under the term "international law" law only in very rudimentary form -as there exists no universal and consistent mechanism of enforcement; there effectively exists no separation of powers either to adjudicate such conflicts. The International Court of Justice, part of the edifice of the United Nations Organization, is not the "constitutional court" of the international community. The sheer number of contradictions risks undermining the very legitimacy of the United Nations and may make the "international rule of law" an elusive goal.
There are essentially two types of normative inconsistencies of which we shall highlight some of the most striking ones, with far-reaching consequences for the stability and reliability of the system of inter-state relations. We are dealing (a) with strictly logical contradictions, i.e. incompatibilities of normative content, as in the case of "sovereign equality" vs. inequality derived from special privilege as embodied in the veto power of certain member states of the UN Security 2(7), 2016
Council. 2 (In this context, both "equality" and "inequality," are to be understood in the normative, not factual, sense.) The second type of inconsistencies (b) results from ambiguity in regard to the hierarchy of norms in the international system. This particularly relates to the status of jus cogens of general international law. One of the most obvious examples is the conflict between the norm of non-interference, derived from national sovereignty, and fundamental norms of human rights. Do norms of a higher category effectively abrogate those of a less basic nature? (The question is similar to the normative conflict in a domestic system where the individual's right to property may, in certain cases, be subordinated to considerations of the common good. In such cases, however, there are elaborate judicial procedures to resolve the conflict on the basis of the respective constitution.) The dilemmata resulting from and controversies surrounding practices of "humanitarian intervention"
3 -or actions under the "Responsibility to Protect" According to Article 94(2) of the UN Charter, enforcement of judgments of the ICJ by the Security Council is at the discretion of the Council, which is not compatible with the idea of compulsory jurisdiction in a context of a separation of powers.
criminal law; (b) the overall compatibility between different bodies of international law and specific treaties ("systemic consistency" of contemporary international law); and (c), on an exemplary basis, contradictions between specific maxims of international law. The issues will be demonstrated, in particular, in regard to the legal status and doctrinaire evaluation of the international use of force, of national sovereignty and of human rights. The enumeration of 10 exemplary cases -most of which, most of the time, are hidden from public scrutiny -will be followed by questions as to the reasons behind these contradictions and inconsistencies and by a reevaluation of the meaning of "rule of law" in the international context.
Contradictions within the United Nations Charter
(1) Principle of sovereign equality ( ) versus the right to intervene according to the doctrines of "humanitarian intervention" or "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), both of which are based on the interpretation of human rights as jus cogens of general international law:
As explained in the introductory remarks of chapter (B) above, this normative conflict may only be resolved if consensus can be reached in the international community on the hierarchy of norms and if there is an independent, impartial body to decide on the use of force and its scope. The UN Security Council's coercive powers are tied to its role in the preservation of peace and security and may only indirectly be activated for a collective use of force with humanitarian purpose, namely if the Council, under Article 39 of the Charter, determines that a situation of human rights violations or a humanitarian emergency in a member state constitutes a "threat to the peace." However, the crux of the matter is that the Council, for reasons partly explained under (1) and (2) cise is ultimately at the discretion of an existing state. The very notion of "selfdetermination" makes no normative sense if its exercise in a given case depends upon the consent of the state that sees in that very act a threat to its territorial integrity, i.e. a challenge to its sovereign status within the international community, guaranteed by the UN Charter.
12 This unresolved conflict between two foundational norms of international law has profoundly destabilized the international system and has been the source of political disputes with the threat of extra-legal settlement by resort to armed force. Again, this contradiction exemplifies the precariousness of the international rule of law as guiding principle of a global system of peace.
Contradictions related to international criminal justice
(5) National sovereignty versus universal jurisdiction:
The norm of "national sovereignty," enshrined in the UN Charter as "sovereign equality" of all member states, implies strict adherence to the rule of noninterference into the internal affairs of states (of which criminal jurisdiction is one of the main areas Court's jurisdiction over war crimes solely relates to cases where conventional weapons are used. It specifically excluded the use of nuclear arms from jurisdiction of the Court, stating that Article 8(2)(b) -that deals with intentional attacks on civilians -only covers conventional warfare. 22 Although the declaration further stated that this exclusion from jurisdiction will only prevail as long as there exists no comprehensive ban on the use of nuclear arms -which would have to be specified in an annex to the Rome Statute by way of an amendment, the declaration effectively amounts to a "res- policies -for which it anyway enjoys de facto "immunity" due to Article 27(3) of the UN Charter.
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As of today, there exists no overarching system of norms, agreed upon among all states, that would make it possible to resolve this conflict (between the exercise of sovereignty and the requirements of international criminal justice) within the normative realm.
In spite of its labeling as "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations," 54 the ICJ is not the constitutional court of the international community. In its own interpretation, for temic contradictions in contemporary international law, and in particular within the United Nations system, resulting from an unrestrained exercise of the national interest under the auspices of state sovereignty, have not only made the global order ever more precarious, and even more so in the absence of a balance of power, 56 but threaten to undermine the very idea of the "international rule of law," embodied by the United Nations Organization.
As a kind of guiding principle of a polity, whether domestic or international, the notion of the "rule of law" makes no sense unless normative contradictions are eliminated -or avenues are seriously pursued to resolve systemic inconsistencies. If not, norms may be declared valid simply on the basis of a priority of interests -which will nurture a legal culture of "anything goes" where arbitrariness replaces reliability and accountability of state behavior. What would be important, in that regard, is that consensus is reached on a pre- So far, however, a basic precondition of such a normative syllogism in the inter-state context is not in place: In spite of the vast compendium of definitions produced by the International Law Commission of the United Nations, a "normative hermeneutics" that would assist states to agree on a clear and unambiguous definition of legal terms (even as basic as "self-determination," "sovereignty," "use of force," "self-defense," or "equality") is not in sight -as there exists no general agreement either on what, for instance, constitutes norms of jus cogens.
58 There is also the obstacle of realpolitik: a more precise definition of those terms will remain a desideratum simply because vagueness is often a requirement of consensus -especially when interests are to be camouflaged in legal terminology.
Apart from the philosophical caveat that makes us aware of the fragile nature of law in the power-centered framework of inter-state relations, there is also a twofold caveat of realpolitik (or, more euphemistically, diplomacy): (a) Contradictions between norms often result from conflicts of interests, and, (b) as far as the United Nations Charter is con- 57 On an earlier effort of the author to establish criteria for such a procedure see: "Die Prinzipien des Völkerrechts und die Menschenrechte: Zur Frage der Vereinbarkeit zweier Normensysteme," in: Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 32 (1981) over norms leaves the international community -or, more precisely, the system of interstate relations -in a state of limbo that makes the "international rule of law" ever more elusive.
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